Michel's Theory and Conditional Clauses

Michel briefly treats conditional sentences in his work on the Hebrew verb forms in the Psalter. When dealing with the conditional sentence with the pattern: Protasis (Yiqtol) apodosis (Qatal) the apodosis does not follow after the execution of the protasis, but the apodosis represents as already existing fact which now becomes clear.

The Problem for Michel's Theory

Exodus 21:11 presents a challenge for Michel's description of the use of the verbal forms in such constructions. I will illustrate the problem then attempt a possible solution which will salvage Michel's overall theory.

We need verse 10 as well for some context: אם אחרת יקח לו שׁארה כסותה וענתה לא יגרע (If he should take another wife for himself he must not diminish her food, clothing, or love-making.) Then verse 11: ואם שׁלשׁ אלה לא יעשה לה ויצאה חנם אין כסף (But if he won't provide these three things for her she may go out freely, without payment.)

Verse 11 begins with a yiqtol in the protasis which depends on the will or ability of the husband to do or not do something. This makes sense because Michel argues that yiqtol is dependent in this way. But the apodosis is weqatal. Michel argues that these actions are not dependent on any other action, or thing, outside of them. But doesn't the wife's going depend on the husband's not providing? This would make the qatal a kind of dependent action by Michel's definition.

A Possible Solution

Conditional sentences are a subtype of "causation" relations between sentences. Jan Renkema (The Texture of Discourse) speaks of 5 kinds of causation relationships which should be clearly distinguished: cause-effect, reason-result, means-purpose, concessive-outcome, and condition-consequence). Cause-effect is distinguished from reason-result by the fact that in cause-effect there is absence of will, i.e. the effect follows by necessity from the cause. In reason-result the result happens because of the will/volition of the acting subject. The condition relation sets up a causation relationship in a non-reality, or hypothetical mood.

In Exodus 21:11 one must determine what kind of causation relation is being set up in this hypothetical senario. One must ask why did the author select Yiqtol or the protasis and qatal for the apodosis instead of yiqtol in both clauses like the immediately preceding conditional sentence in verse 10. Michel teaches that yiqtol in protasis and apodosis indicates that when the first actions occurs it implies the execution of the second action, i.e. the second action follows necessarily from the first. This is Renkema's cause-effect relation. However, what if the author of Ex 21:11 selected qatal in the apodosis because the wife's going out is optional? In other words, he wanted to express a reason-result relationship in which the woman is free to leave, if she wants to (See the role volition must play!), when her husband reduces her previous supply of food, clothing, and sex. Her leaving does not follow by necessity from such conditions (she doesn't have to go out), but she may leave or stay. Thus the qatal presents what Michel calls an accidental action, i.e. one which the acting subject can either do, or leave undone. Of course, this is precisely what Michel says is the nature of the Qatal. With this explanation his theory seems to be in tact in spite of the apparent challenge Ex 21:11 presents. The text does, however, demonstrate that Michel's simple opposition between dependent (yiqtol) and absolute (qatal) actions may need further nuace. Here is a translation to bring out the syntax more clearly.

If he won't provide these three things for her, then it becomes a matter of fact that she may go out freely without payment.

I welcome your comments and questions.